Who is Afraid of the European Council? The Court of Justice’s Cautious Approach to the Independence of Domestic Judges (Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice and Equality v LM) by Krajewski, Michal Andrzej
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Who is Afraid of the European Council? The Court of Justice’s Cautious Approach to
the Independence of Domestic Judges (Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice
and Equality v LM)
Krajewski, Michal Andrzej
Published in:





Citation for published version (APA):
Krajewski, M. A. (2018). Who is Afraid of the European Council? The Court of Justice’s Cautious Approach to
the Independence of Domestic Judges (Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice and Equality v LM).
European Constitutional Law Review, 14(4), 792-813.
Download date: 23. jun.. 2020
 
This is the author’s manuscript post-review published 
in 14(4) European Constitutional Law Review (2018), cambridge.org/euconst. 
1 
 
Who is Afraid of the European Council? 
The Court of Justice’s Cautious Approach to the Independence of Domestic Judges  





The LM1 case offered first proof of the expected disruptions to judicial cooperation between EU 
Member States and Poland due to its controversial judicial reforms.2 The case concerned a man 
accused of drug trafficking who had subsequently fled to Ireland. A Polish court issued a European 
Arrest Warrant for Mr. LM for the purpose of conducting a criminal prosecution. The Irish High 
Court, which was to decide on the surrender of Mr. LM to Poland, doubted the ability of Polish courts 
to ensure a fair trial. It relied most of all on the Commission’s reasoned proposal, submitted to the 
Council under Article 7(1) TEU, to state a clear risk of a serious breach by Poland of the rule of law.3 
Hence, it made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice asking whether cogent evidence of 
systemic breaches to judicial independence in a Member State issuing an EAW provided sufficient 
grounds to refuse its execution. The Court of Justice, however, held fast to its earlier approach, as laid 
out in Aranyosi and Căldăraru,4 aimed at limiting exceptions to the principle of mutual recognition. It 
stated that it was also necessary to consider the individual situation of the person sought by the EAW, 
and to determine whether that person ran the risk of undergoing an unfair trial in the issuing Member 
State.  
Some commentators had hoped that the Court would authoritatively assess the state of judicial 
independence in Poland.5 The Polish, Hungarian and Spanish governments intervened before the 
Court with a contrary view in opposition to the idea that judicial independence in a Member State 
could be assessed by foreign courts or by the Court of Justice. These governments claimed that only 
the European Council was empowered to state systemic deficiencies in the rule of law in a Member 
State under Article 7(2) TEU.6 Importantly, the first, preventive stage of the procedure under Article 
7(1) TEU against Poland is still pending before the Council.  
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LM has raised a variety of issues regarding the operation of mutual trust and mutual recognition. 
However, this commentary focusses on the potential impact of EU law and EU institutions on 
domestic judicial independence in the aftermath of LM. Firstly, it analyses the considerable difficulties 
entailed by the ‘abstract’ prong of the test prescribed by the Court. These difficulties are related to the 
legal nature of judicial independence, which is operationalised very differently by the various EU 
Member States. Domestic courts may have difficulty assessing foreign laws that affect the functioning 
of their counterparts in other Member States, which speaks in favour of a centralised review of judicial 
independence by the Court of Justice.  
Secondly, the commentary reflects on a partial solution to said problem in the current Polish context. 
It argues that when courts are asked to rule on the execution of Polish EAWs or other judicial 
decisions, they should focus, within the abstract prong, on those elements of the Polish reforms that 
have an impact on rank-and-file judges. What is crucial in this respect is the new legal regime of 
disciplinary proceedings for rank-and-file judges, as well as the institutional and political context in 
which this regime is being implemented.  
Thirdly, the commentary explores how the Court has conceived of the division – between itself, 
domestic courts, the European Council and the Commission – of powers and responsibility to assess 
domestic judicial independence. It is argued that the Court’s approach in LM to its own powers and 
responsibility contrasts with that in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP).7 In ASJP, which 
was settled a few months earlier, the Court had firmly asserted its mandate stemming from Article 
19(1), para 2, TEU to autonomously scrutinise domestic measures affecting judicial independence, 
even if such measures did not implement specific EU provisions. In LM, on the contrary, the Court 
delegated the assessment of the Polish system entirely to domestic courts executing EAWs. Moreover, 
ignoring the suggestion of the referring court, the Court upheld the second, ‘concrete’ prong of the 
double test transplanted from Aranyosi and Căldăraru. This prong might render excessively difficult the 
review of the risk of unfair trials in issuing Member States. The Court’s reasoning suggests that it 
sought to avoid an automatic ban on surrenders to Poland so as not to pre-empt a decision by the 
European Council under Article 7(2) TEU. The latter depends however on political factors and may 
actually never be reached.8 As a consequence, domestic judicial independence may not receive a level 
of protection under EU law as strong as one might have expected in the aftermath of ASJP.9 
 
THE COURT’S JUDGMENT AND ITS BACKGROUND 
The High Court had submitted two questions to the Court of Justice. First, should the test for the risk 
of unfair trials in the issuing Member State be essentially abstract? Does cogent evidence of systemic 
breaches to judicial independence in a Member State issuing the EAW provide sufficient grounds to 
refuse the surrender? Or is it also necessary to carry out a concrete test, as in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, 
focussed on an individualised risk to the person being sought pursuant to the EAW? Second, if the 
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concrete prong turns out to be necessary, what kind of information should be demanded from the 
issuing court to discount the risk of an unfair trial in the individual case?  
AG Tanchev opined that a potential breach of Article 47 of the Charter is capable of justifying the 
postponement of surrender, but only if it amounted to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.10 He also proposed 
transplanting the two-prong test from Aranyosi and Căldăraru.11 Following the general lines of 
reasoning taken by AG Tanchev, the Court confirmed that a breach of judicial independence – the 
essence of the right to a fair trial and the core building block of mutual trust – was capable of 
authorising an exception to the execution of EAWs.12 Although such an exception is not expressly 
provided for in the Framework Decision,13 the Court did note that Article 1(3) confirms an obligation 
to respect fundamental rights.14 However, the Court did not endorse the concept of ‘flagrant denial of 
justice’ proposed by AG Tanchev, endorsing instead a lower threshold for ‘a real risk of breach’.15 The 
AG’s proposal has been criticised for imposing an impossible burden of proof on the applicant16 and 
for ignoring the underlying idea of mutual trust in a high level of fundamental rights protection across 
the EU.17 
The Court did not autonomously assess the state of judicial independence in Poland. It also silently 
disregarded a tentative assessment proposed by the referring judge. In the latter’s view, ‘the recent 
legislative changes have been so damaging to the rule of law that… the common value of the rule of 
law in Poland has been breached.’18 Relying on the Commission’s reasoned proposal submitted under 
Article 7 TEU, and the opinions of the Venice Commission, the referring judge noted that the 
membership of the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary had been altered, 
and that the Minister of Justice and the Public Prosecutor General had been merged into one office 
while attributing disciplinary powers over court presidents to them. As a result, independent 
constitutional review of legislation and fair criminal trials were no longer possible in Poland.19  
The Court did not reformulate the questions of the referring judge to verify this assessment. It merely 
confirmed that an adequate test for the risk of unfair trials would need to be two-pronged. Firstly, 
executing courts would have to find systemic and generalised deficiencies liable to affect the judiciary 
in the issuing Member State. Executing courts are bound by standards derived from Article 47 of the 
Charter. The Court restated these standards in very general terms. It mentioned explicit legislative 
rules regarding judicial appointments, protection against removal from office, a level of remuneration 
commensurate with the importance of judicial functions, and rules preventing the use of disciplinary 
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proceedings to influence the judicial decision-making.20 The Court indicated that domestic courts must 
rely on material that is ‘objective, reliable, specific and properly updated’. It immediately added that 
‘information in a reasoned proposal recently addressed by the Commission to the Council on the basis 
of Article 7(1) TEU is particularly relevant for the purposes of that assessment.’21 
Secondly, executing courts must establish substantial grounds for believing that the requested person 
faces the risk of an unfair trial in the issuing Member State due to the particular circumstances of her 
case. AG Tanchev mentioned, for instance, the fact of belonging to a discriminated social group, or the 
political nature of the offence for which the person is being sought, although these factors were not 
repeated by the Court.22 What the Court did find relevant was whether the systemic deficiencies 
affected specifically those courts which have jurisdiction over the requested person’s case, following 
her surrender.23 To verify the individualised risk, the executing court should request ‘supplementary 
information’ or ‘any objective material’ from the issuing court under Article 15(2) of the Framework 
Decision.24 At this point, it should be emphasised that, despite an explicit question from the referring 
judge about the specific types of evidence suitable for the concrete test, the Court nowhere specified 
what kind of ‘supplementary information’ or ‘objective material’ it had it mind. Importantly, the 
referring judge had indicated that in the Polish case, the controversial legal regime applied to all rank-
and-file judges. Hence, the concrete prong seemed redundant.25 The referring judge had opined: 
‘where there are such egregious defects in the system of justice, it appears unrealistic to require a 
requested person to go further and demonstrate how, in their individual case, these defects will affect 
their specific trial’.26 Would a declaration by the issuing Polish judge that she had not (yet) been 
subjected to political pressure, or that the case was of no political nature, qualify as ‘supplementary 
information’ or ‘objective material’? 
What is crucial is how the Court justified the upholding of the concrete prong. The Court’s reasoning 
suggests that not only did it aim to preserve the principle of mutual recognition, but also to 
distinguish its own competence from that of the European Council. The Court seems to have followed 
the interpretation of juxtaposed Articles 7(2) TEU, 19(1) TEU and 47 of the Charter, as suggested by 
AG Tanchev. The AG had opined that the Court was responsible for fair trials in individual cases, 
whereas the European Council managed the systemic compliance of domestic judicial systems with 
the rule of law.27 In support of the concrete prong, the Court cited recital 10 of the Framework 
Decision, according to which the EAW mechanism could be suspended ‘only in the event of a serious 
and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles set out in Article 2 TEU, 
determined by the European Council pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU, with the consequences set out in 
Article 7(3) TEU.’28 In the event of such a decision by the European Council, the Council could, under 
Article 7(3) TEU, suspend certain Treaty rights of the concerned Member State, including the 
operation of the EAW Framework Decision in respect of that Member State. The Court emphasised 
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that only in such an event could the execution of EAWs issued by this Member State be refused 
automatically, without the need to carry out the concrete test.29 
 
COMMENTS 
How to judge Judicial Independence? 
The abstract prong requires a complex assessment of alleged deficiencies in the affected judicial 
system. In my view, given this complexity, as well as the need to ensure legal certainty and the 
predictability of judicial decisions across the EU, the Court should have provided a more detailed 
interpretation of judicial independence standards, or even immediately applied them to the Polish 
context. The judicial reforms in Poland will most likely affect not only the EAW mechanism but all 26 
EU acts providing for mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal and civil matters.30 New 
tasks imposed on domestic courts executing Polish judicial decisions will significantly prolong 
proceedings and may result in divergent decisions, thereby undermining legal certainty. It could be 
argued the Court of Justice would have difficulty in constantly monitoring the rapidly changing 
situation in Poland.31 I believe however that even if the Court were to assess the situation several 
times, the centralised assessment would still provide more legal certainty than the solution chosen in 
LM.  
It has also been argued that the Court needed to remain within the boundaries of the question asked 
by the High Court. The new legal regime in Poland, as the argument goes, was not the core concern of 
the Court of Justice.32 It should be emphasised however that under Article 19(1), para 1, TEU the Court 
is called upon to ensure the observance of EU law across the EU. This includes ensuring the standards 
of judicial independence inherent to effective judicial protection. The latter is guaranteed – in the 
fields covered by EU law – by Article 19(1), para 2, TEU. To ensure the observance of EU law, the 
Court enjoys ‘procedural freedom’ in the preliminary reference procedure, manifested by the 
competence to reformulate the questions asked or invoke provisions of EU law which have not been 
invoked by the referring court.33 The previous case law confirms the Court’s great leeway in deciding 
whether to provide the referring court with a merely general and abstract interpretation of relevant 
EU provisions or a more detailed interpretation, tantamount to an application of law.34 For instance, in 
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Aranyosi and Căldăraru35, the Court had not carried out an autonomous assessment of prison conditions 
in Hungary, merely indicating factors that executing courts should consider, and pointing to the 
relevant types of evidence. In N.S., on the contrary, the Court did confirm the overburdening of the 
asylum system in Greece, relying on the judgments of the ECtHR.36 
In my view, the very general interpretation of judicial independence standards provided by the Court 
in LM is not sufficient to guarantee the fundamental rights of persons subject to Polish EAWs or other 
judicial decisions. The Court only briefly mentioned the rules for judicial appointments, guarantees 
against removal from office, a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the 
function and a fair disciplinary regime.37 But the problem for domestic courts lies in the major 
differences between how the Member States operationalise judicial independence. There are multiple 
models for judicial appointments and disciplinary regimes involving a variety of judicial and non-
judicial actors. The rules for judicial appointments, disciplinary actions, immunities, removal from 
office, and remuneration cannot be analysed in isolation but are all part of a system that should be 
seen holistically. One cannot simply focus on a comparison of discrete legal arrangements. Due to said 
complexity, domestic courts should be deemed ill-equipped to assess foreign laws regarding the 
organisation of judicial systems. This task requires an in-depth knowledge of the law and practice of 
the foreign system, as well as a holistic perspective. For instance, a firmly embedded practice of the 
secondment of German or Polish judges to the ministries of justice could be deemed unconstitutional 
in other EU Member States. The same applies to the powerful position of court presidents in many 
Central and Eastern European States, or to the French solution by which the members of the Council 
of State, the supreme administrative court, also function as advisors to the executive.38 
Another illustration of this difficulty was provided by the Polish government in proceedings before 
the Court of Justice, at which the Polish government alluded to sustained controversy regarding 
judicial appointments in Ireland.39 The point was to illustrate that one cannot expect ordinary courts to 
infallibly assess the independence of their foreign counterparts; ordinary courts will likely apply 
criteria of judicial independence derived from their own legal systems. According to the Polish 
government, if Polish courts were to apply their own criteria, they might end up having doubts about 
the independence of Irish courts. Formally, the discretion of political authorities with regard to 
judicial appointments is far more restrained in Poland than in Ireland.40 The Polish President can only 
appoint judges from a list of candidates presented by the National Council of the Judiciary, the 
majority of whose members are judges themselves.41 The Irish President, on the contrary, appoints 
judges upon the proposal of the government, and recommendations to the latter by the Judicial 
Appointments Advisory Board are not binding.42 Obviously, this comparison is selective and overly 
simplistic. The information provided does not in itself lead to the conclusion that Irish judges are 
subordinate to the political authorities that appointed them. But the argument of the Polish 
government shows that even though it is possible to formulate general and abstract criteria of judicial 
independence, their application requires a holistic, in-depth and contextual analysis. The Court has 
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adequate resources to carry out such an analysis. Unlike domestic courts, the Court is a multinational 
institution with potentially far-reaching procedural tools. The highest authorities of an affected 
Member State may intervene in preliminary reference proceedings by submitting written and oral 
observations. The Court may also take evidence and seek further information from them.43 
The Court clarified only certain general elements of the abstract test. It began by qualifying judicial 
independence as forming part of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial.44 According to 
Article 52 of the Charter, any limitations to fundamental rights and freedoms must respect their 
essence. The essence of a fundamental right ‘epitomises the untouchable core that should under no 
circumstances be restricted or interfered with.’45 Evidently, judicial independence can be guaranteed 
to a greater or lesser extent by various legal safeguards. But, for the purposes of compliance with the 
fundamental right to a fair trial, it must be treated as a binary legal norm that cannot be subject to any 
legitimate limitation or proportionality balancing. Hence, an executing court must decide whether the 
concerned Member State has failed to meet the required threshold of judicial independence and thus 
given rise to a real risk of breach of the fundamental right to a fair trial.  
Such an assessment necessarily entails a discretionary judgment. The concept of judicial independence 
is based on appearance.46 There are no infallible mechanisms ensuring judicial objectivity. The best that 
can be done is to create an appearance of independence: an institutional and procedural system which, 
in the eyes of reasonable observers, minimises the probability of undue interference with the decisions 
of courts.47 The aim, as the Court put it, is to ‘dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals 
as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests 
before it.’48 The assessment of whether a foreign judicial system gives rise to an appearance of 
independence, as already argued, requires a complex assessment which might lead to deep 
controversy. The latter might concern not only the results of the assessment but also the cognitive 
ability of a rank-and-file foreign judge to carry it out or the right of the Member State concerned to be 
heard before the executing judge.49 
 
Two Minutes to Midnight 
To facilitate the task of domestic courts, the Court has emphasised the ‘particular relevance’ of the 
Commission’s reasoned proposal.50 Domestic courts cannot, however, assume that as soon as the 
reasoned proposal has been submitted, the abstract test is automatically fulfilled. In my view, the 
‘particular relevance’ may be interpreted as referring to the evidential value only. The decision-maker 
within the pending Article 7(1) TEU procedure is the Council (which needs to obtain the consent of 
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the European Parliament), not the Commission.51 Article 47 of the Charter requires that courts 
autonomously establish and assess the facts of each case, providing compelling justifications of their 
findings. Judges are subject only to law and may not assume to be bound by instructions or 
assessments of administrative authorities,52 including the Commission. Otherwise, reasoned proposals 
could be deemed to be acts which ‘produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties’, within the meaning of 
Article 263(4) TFEU.53 The legality of such acts could be challenged before the Court with an action for 
annulment lodged by an affected Member State, or by other Member States and EU institutions as 
well.54 The Court’s review in such a procedure covers both procedural and substantive grounds.55 This 
would be somewhat paradoxical; under Article 269 TFEU the Court can review final decisions of the 
European Council, taken on the basis of reasoned proposals, on procedural grounds only. Moreover, 
as the Commission itself has noted, the reasoned proposal submitted in the Polish case stated only 
that there was a ‘clear risk’ of a serious breach of the rule of law under Article 7(1) TEU, a concept 
which is different from that of a ‘serious and persistent breach’ under Article 7(2) TEU. Only the latter 
can result in imposing sanctions, including a suspension of the EAW mechanism.56 
From this, it follows that domestic courts should autonomously assess, within the abstract prong, the 
information provided in the Commission’s reasoned proposal. In my view, they should particularly 
consider direct threats to the independence of rank-and-file judges who decide ordinary criminal or 
civil cases. The independence of rank-and-file judges is crucial for the fluent functioning of EAWs and 
other mutual recognition mechanisms. However, this issue is overshadowed in the reasoned proposal 
regarding Poland by the analysis of damage to the highest judicial bodies. The reasoned proposal 
devoted the most attention to the unconstitutional changes in the membership of the Constitutional 
Tribunal responsible for the constitutional review of legislation, the Supreme Court responsible for 
maintaining the uniformity of case law, and the National Council of the Judiciary responsible for 
judicial appointments.57 But how do the changes to the highest judicial bodies, even if manifestly 
unconstitutional, affect the fairness of individual criminal trials presided over by rank-and-file judges? 
What is crucial in this respect are the new powers of the Minister of Justice to influence disciplinary 
proceedings against rank-and-file judges. The problem is that, in its reasoned proposal, the 
Commission devoted only a footnote to this paramount issue!58 It would seem that the issue has 
however been noticed and underscored by the Court. The Court devoted a separate paragraph to it 
and prescribed a new formula, stating that ‘the disciplinary regime… must display the necessary 
guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its being used as a system of political control of the content 
of judicial decisions.’59 
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December 2016, Case T-713/14, International and European Public Services Organisation v ECB. 
55 Article 263(2) TFEU. 
56 Statement of observations submitted by the Commission in Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, 7 
May 2018, para 8, published by the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, available at <http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-
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58 European Commission, supra, n. 3., footnote 91. See also, paras. 133-135. 
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The Polish Minister of Justice can, at present, initiate disciplinary proceedings against any judge, and 
appoint and supervise a disciplinary prosecutor. The Minister single-handedly selects first-instance 
disciplinary judges. 60 The membership of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, acting as a 
disciplinary court of final instance, will be proposed to the President by the National Council of the 
Judiciary,61 which is now composed in majority of judges closely associated with the Minister of 
Justice. Due to its lack of independence from the political authorities, the National Council of the 
Judiciary has had its membership in the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary suspended.62 
Importantly, disciplinary proceedings may concern the substance of a judicial decision, if the decision 
is believed to contain a ‘manifest breach of law’.63 A reasonable observer might perceive a ‘chilling 
effect’: at least some judges will refrain from rendering judgments against the expressed or assumed 
preferences of the Minister of Justice and the political majority. What is also important is that the new 
powers of the Minister of Justice to appoint, dismiss and supervise court presidents are formally 
subject to review by only the National Council of Judiciary.64 Court presidents clearly have the 
instruments at their disposal to effectively influence the decision-making of rank-and-file judges.65 
They assign judges to chambers, appoint chamber presidents, have powers with regard to case 
allocation and withdrawing, process complaints from court users, and can demand the initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings.66  
This brief analysis shows that the appearance of judicial independence in Poland has been seriously 
undermined. Even though cases involving the politically-motivated dismissal of rank-and-file judges 
have yet to be reported, there is already substantial evidence of political pressure aimed at affecting 
the substance of individual judgments. There are also reports of preliminary disciplinary actions being 
initiated against rank-and-file judges for their public statements in defence of judicial independence, 
or the substance of their decisions, including decisions to make preliminary references to the Court of 
Justice.67 It could be concluded that the current legal regime in Poland enables political pressure on 
rank-and-file judges, no matter what type of case they are hearing. Judicial independence, rather than 
rely on institutional guarantees, now seems to depend exclusively on the personal character traits of 
individual judges. 
 
Who is the Judge of Judicial Independence in the EU? 
In the preliminary reference, the High Court opined that the concrete prong was inadequate, as it 
appeared difficult to detach the probability of unfair trials in individual cases from general concerns 
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amended or added by Articles 108(17-19) of the Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court, Dz.U. 2018 r., poz. 5. 
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about judicial independence.68 These are two sides of the same coin.69 As all rank-and-file judges no 
longer enjoy protection from political pressure, citizens have reasonable grounds to doubt the fairness 
of any trial. The Court however upheld the concrete prong in LM. Following this judgment, the 
referring court noted that the Polish Deputy Minister of Justice had publicly called LM, prior to 
conviction, a ‘dangerous criminal from a drug mafia’. This could be construed as illicit pressure on a 
court that would hear the LM case.70 Importantly, under Article 6 of the ECHR, public pressure 
exerted on judges by senior politicians can amount to an undermining of the appearance of judicial 
independence and, consequently, to a breach of the right to a fair trial.71 As a result, the Irish judge 
referred additional questions to the issuing court in Poland. The latter’s reply provides evidence that 
the concrete test may not work in practice. According to press information, the reply to the Irish judge 
was drafted by a new president of the issuing court who had been appointed by the current Minister 
of Justice. The court president assured the Irish judge of the independence of Polish courts. In 
reaction, the Irish judge once again requested information from the judge who had issued the EAW; 
this request is pending.72 Other courts executing Polish judicial decisions have also requested 
additional information from Polish courts, but the latter have focussed on publicly available 
information on the legislative measures introduced.73 Clearly, any judge who provided a foreign court 
with information about political pressure being exerted would face disciplinary action. In my view, 
this demonstrates the inappropriateness of the concrete test. 
The Court of Justice rejected the Irish judge’s scepticism of the concrete prong for two reasons. First, 
the general pattern of the Court’s reasoning suggests that exceptions to the principles of mutual trust 
and mutual recognition must be construed as narrowly as possible; hence, they may only be applied 
in concrete cases. But the main argument in favour of the concrete test was recital 10 of the Framework 
Decision, according to which the implementation of the EAW mechanism may be suspended only on 
the basis of decision by the European Council, pursuant to Article 7 TEU.74 The Court distinguished 
between its own competence and the competence of the European Council. It seemed to follow the 
arguments presented by national governments and the Commission, which claimed that, had it not 
been for the concrete test, the Court could have circumvented the pending Article 7 TEU procedure 
and pre-empted the assessment of the European Council.75 
The Court could have prescribed, in my view, a purely abstract, one-prong test without exceeding its 
competence, even if this amounted to an automatic ban on surrenders to Poland. The power of the 
Council to suspend the operation of the EAW mechanism following a decision by the European 
Council is only mentioned expressly in a recital of the Framework Decision. Article 7(3) TEU lays 
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Opinion of AG Bot, para 87. 
down a general competence for the Council to ‘to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the 
application of the Treaties to the Member State in question’ but does not specifically mention 
suspension of the EAW mechanism. An act of secondary law, let alone its recital, cannot modify the 
power and obligation assigned to the Court and domestic courts by primary law to secure effective 
legal protection in fields covered by EU law. Besides, nothing suggests that Article 7 TEU had 
introduced any restriction on the powers and obligations of the EU judiciary with regard to effective 
judicial protection inherent to the rule of law. The fact that the rule of law is also protected before a 
political body by means of the procedure under Article 7 TEU stems from its fundamental nature in 
EU law, which requires such additional safeguards.76  Moreover, as can be inferred from the case law 
of the ECtHR, systemic guarantees for the independence of domestic courts are perfectly amenable to 
judicial review by a supranational court.77 The complexity of such an assessment does not necessarily 
require leaving the decision to a political body. 
The Court’s cautious approach in LM contrasts with its attitude in ASJP. The two cases are different in 
procedural terms, but in both cases, the source of controversy lay in domestic measures of general 
application which could affect judicial independence. ASJP concerned judicial independence in a 
direct manner. The preliminary question related to the lawfulness of a Portuguese measure of general 
application that reduced judicial salaries. LM concerned judicial independence in an indirect manner. 
The immediate subject-matter of the preliminary question was an adequate method for assessing the 
risk of an unfair trial following surrender to an issuing Member State. However, the question was 
made in the specific context of the controversial judicial reforms in Poland. As already argued, the 
Court must provide any interpretation of EU law it deems necessary to ensure that the law is observed 
in the main case and in similar cases in the future. And yet, in LM the Court showed self-restraint so 
as to preserve the competence of the European Council, even though fundamental rights and legal 
certainty might have necessitated an autonomous assessment of the Polish legal regime and a 
renunciation of the concrete prong. 
In ASJP, on the contrary, the Court had invoked Article 19(1), para 2, TEU as a justiciable rule-of-law 
clause, which ‘gives concrete expression’ to the rule-of-law value enshrined in Article 2 TEU.78 Under 
Article 19(1), para 2, TEU, ‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by Union law.’ The Court linked the concept of ‘effective legal 
protection’79 from this provision to the concepts of an ‘effective remedy’ and a ‘fair trial before an 
independent tribunal’ contained in Article 47 of the Charter. On this basis, the Court assessed 
Portuguese provisions reducing judicial salaries. Contrary to the logic of the Charter and its Article 
51(1), the Court disregarded whether the contested provisions implemented EU law. Instead, it held 
that what triggers the applicability of Article 19(1), para 2, TEU is that a concerned domestic court acts 
‘in the fields covered by Union law’. In other words, the Court found in Article 19(1), para 2, TEU an 
objective legal obligation to secure the independence of domestic courts. It is thus complementary to 
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Article 47 of the Charter, which establishes a subjective right to an independent judge. Article 19(1), 
para 2, TEU abstracts from the issue of individual holders of substantive rights. It focusses on a 
domestic court, acting in its capacity as an EU court of general competence.80 To assess domestic 
judicial independence under Article 19(1), para 2, TEU, the Court does not any longer need a direct 
link with a particular, substantive EU provision; an indirect link is sufficient.81 Such a reading of this 
provision’s scope of application ratione materiae opened the door for infringement actions against the 
undermining of judicial independence in Poland82 and preliminary references in the cases of judges 
complaining about violations of their own guarantees of independence.83 
The Court’s approach in ASJP is supported by the origins and purpose of Article 19(1), para 2, TEU 
and Article 47 of the Charter. By introducing both provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Member 
States confirmed and codified the pre-Lisbon case law84 according to which domestic courts are co-
responsible for ensuring effective legal/judicial protection of Union rights. If effective judicial 
protection cannot be ensured directly by the Court in direct actions, the task falls to domestic courts. 
The Member States chose to confirm this principle expressly in the Treaty, instead of relaxing the locus 
standi criteria of individual direct actions before the Court.85 Article 19(1), para 2, TEU confirms the 
bifurcated and decentralised nature of the EU judicial system, based on both the Court of Justice and 
domestic courts.86 It is a unique provision inasmuch as it imposes requirements on the institutional 
systems of the Member States themselves, and not that of the Union. Most importantly, it also 
authorises the Court to enforce these requirements. The Court’s reading of Article 19(1), para 2, TEU 
should not be seen as sudden and surprising. It has for quite some time been analysed as a provision 
with potentially far-reaching implications, possibly prompting the Court to further concretise and 
harmonise domestic obligations with regard to effective judicial protection.87 The intensity of the 
Court’s interference with domestic judicial procedure has varied,88 but its mandate to impose 
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requirements regarding domestic remedies and procedures is well-established.89 The Court has 
confirmed that domestic courts could even be required to create new remedies and legal avenues if 
the protection of EU rights could not otherwise be guaranteed.90 In the post-Lisbon period, the Court 
has continued to specify the standards of effective judicial protection before domestic courts. For 
instance, it has specified rules regarding access to justice,91 court jurisdiction,92 procedural rights of the 
parties,93 rules on evidence,94 and remedies,95 to name a few. The Court adjudicates issues relating to 
effective judicial protection before national courts on a regular basis.96  
The Court’s strong mandate to concretise the standards of effective judicial protection is strongly 
supported, in my view, by teleological arguments. Enforcement of EU law has always been based on 
the vigilance of private parties willing to invoke their EU rights in domestic courts, oftentimes against 
the individual policies of Member States.97 The procedure for preliminary references from domestic 
courts is perceived as the keystone of the autonomy of EU law and the “integration through law” 
paradigm.98 The effective exercise of the Court’s own mandate and the effectiveness of EU law 
depends on the independence and cooperation of domestic courts.99 Domestic judicial independence 
thus becomes the foundation upon which EU constitutional structures are built.100  
Admittedly, the Court has been directly called upon to assess the independence of adjudicatory 
bodies – not even courts in the strict sense – on only two occasions.101 However, until recently 
problems with domestic judicial independence have not taken the form of deliberate attempts to 
subject judges to close political supervision. Moreover, the concept of effective judicial protection 
forms a coherent whole. Even though its different elements – e.g. access to justice, procedural fairness, 
judicial independence – can be distinguished for analytical purposes, they are, taken together, 
indispensable conditions for the rule of law. This is why they are all encompassed by Article 47 of the 
Charter and, under ASJP, should be relevant for the interpretation of Article 19(1), para 2, TEU.102 The 
latter’s concept of ‘remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection’ is inextricably linked to 
judicial independence. One could hardly speak of effective legal protection worthy of the name if a 
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legal avenue was available for seeking a remedy, but the decision rested in the hands of a judge 
subordinated to political pressure.103 
For these reasons, the Court could, in my view, omit the concrete prong without encroaching upon the 
competence of the European Council. The competence of the Court under Articles 19(1) TEU and 47 of 
the Charter and the competence of the European Council under Article 2 and 7 TEU are parallel.  
However, in ASJP, the Court expressed willingness to use the potential of EU law to protect the 
independence of domestic courts, only to subsequently dilute it in LM. The Court took a step back 
with a view to maintaining mutual recognition and avoiding accusations that it had pre-empted a 
decision by the European Council. What we have thus observed was a clash of several constitutional 
norms: on the one hand, effective judicial protection and the competence of the Court and domestic 
courts to ensure it; on the other, mutual recognition and the competence of the European Council 
under Article 7 TEU. In LM, the Court curtailed effective judicial protection, instead prioritising 
mutual recognition and giving way to a decision by the European Council. This would seem to imply 
that the Court and domestic courts could never state that a situation regarding judicial independence 
in a Member State is so alarming that it requires the suspension of mutual recognition and judicial 
cooperation with that Member State. This seems to be the prerogative of the European Council and the 
Council, bodies composed of heads of state or heads of government, several of whom struggle with 
considerable rule-of-law problems themselves. Domestic courts are now doomed to perform a double 
test which might render judicial review of the risk of unfair trials excessively difficult, thus 
jeopardising the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Dashing the hopes of many commentators, the Court failed to use the full potential of Article 19(1), 
para 2, TUE and Article 47 of the Charter to consolidate domestic judicial independence by providing 
sanctions against Member States that had breached the values underpinning the system of mutual 
recognition. Neither did it provide an authoritative assessment of the recent reforms to the Polish 
judicial system. The Court tried to limit its interference into mutual recognition by prescribing a 
double test from Aranyosi and Căldăraru. But, in practice, the test renders excessively difficult the 
review by executing courts of the risk of unfair trials in Poland. The Court was overly concerned about 
the autonomy of a potential decision by the European Council under Article 7 TEU regarding the rule 
of law in Poland. In my view, the Court should have asserted its autonomous competence to scrutinise 
effective judicial protection of EU rights at the domestic level, as confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which introduced Article 19(1), para 2, TEU. The competence of the European Council should be seen 
as parallel to that of the Court. Leaving the decision to suspend the EAW mechanism to the European 
Council and the Council – political bodies whose members may have a natural tendency to prioritise 
their own interest rather than the rule of law – seem doubtful in light of the EU commitment to 
fundamental rights and the rule of law. None of the governments of backsliding Member States have 
come back on the rule-of-law path due to a threat of Article 7 TEU sanctions, in the imposition of 
which they do not seem to believe.  
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The judgment in LM is a step backward from ASJP. In ASJP, judicial independence was treated as an 
objective obligation of the Member States subject to concretisation and application by the Court. In 
LM, it has been reduced to the subjective right of a particular individual to an independent court in a 
particular case as part of the right to a fair trial, which should be guaranteed by a narrowly-designed 
and difficult-to-perform test.104 In my view, the difference in the Court’s approach is not justified by 
the different procedural context of ASJP as opposed to LM. In both cases, the ultimate source of 
controversy lay in domestic measures of general application that could affect judicial independence. In 
both cases, the Court enjoyed the procedural freedom to provide any interpretation of EU law it 
deemed necessary to secure the effective judicial protection of EU citizens. Clearly, a preliminary 
ruling is not binding in the main case only; rather, it produces erga omnes effects. The Court should not 
stick to framing preliminary questions narrowly, merely to avoid tackling systemic problems with an 
EU concept as fundamental as judicial independence. It remains to be seen how the peer review of 
judicial independence will work in practice, and whether it will generate divergent decisions and 
prolong judicial proceedings. Initial experiences, however, have not been promising. 
The Court will still have chances to enforce Article 19(1), para 2, TEU with regard to Poland. There are 
other cases currently pending before the Court regarding the independence of Polish judiciary: 
infringement proceedings involving ordinary courts105 and preliminary references by the Polish 
Supreme Court and regional courts regarding the independence of rank-and-file judges.106 However, 
the scope of the infringement proceedings is still too narrow to effectively remedy the rule-of-law 
crisis in Poland.107 The Commission has focussed on the most evident breaches of judicial 
independence: the lowering of the retirement age of judges and the prolongation of their mandates by 
the Minister. However, it has failed to broach the crucial issues of new disciplinary proceedings for 
rank-and-file judges, the Minister’s supervisory powers over court presidents, and the one-time 
packing of the Supreme Court with several dozen new judges, all of whom were appointed without 
any truly independent review of the candidates.108 Challenging these ‘reforms’ under Article 19(1), 
para 2, TEU would require a creative interpretation of Article 19(1), para 2, TEU as there have not yet 
been relevant precedents before the Court of Justice. Such broader actions for infringement would 
involve, from the Commission’s perspective, more risk. This may be the reason why the Commission 
has only focused on the most evident breaches of judicial independence in Poland. In my view, 
however, the disciplinary regime for judges, the Minister’s supervisory powers over court presidents, 
and the packing of the Supreme Court with political appointees, are much more important for judicial 
independence than a retirement age for judges that is a few years higher or lower. The Polish courts 
have been trying to fill in the gaps in Commission infringement actions by means of preliminary 
reference. The Polish courts inquired at the Court of Justice about the lawfulness of the new 
disciplinary regime and the packing of the Supreme Court with political appointees, in particular the 
establishment of an entirely new Disciplinary Chamber.109 It is not certain, however, whether the 
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questions are admissible as sufficiently linked to the main case.110 This confirms the previously 
expressed opinion that the main deficiency of the EU with regard to its ability to deal with the rule-of-
law crises lies not in the limited nature of its law, but in the overly careful approach espoused by the 
Commission and other institutions.111  
                                                          
110 S. Biernat, M. Kawczyńska, ‘Why the Polish Supreme Court’s Reference on Judicial Independence to the CJEU is Admissible 
after all’, Verfassungsblog, 23 August 2018, available at < https://verfassungsblog.de/why-the-polish-supreme-courts-reference-
on-judicial-independence-to-the-cjeu-is-admissible-after-all/>, visited 20 October 2018. 
111 L. Pech, D. Kochenov, ‘Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and its First 
Activation’, 55 Journal of Common Market Studies (2016), p. 1062-1074, at p.1065. 
